Gemma scope paper
Thread (13 posts)
Thinking Summary
The user has shared a paper about Gemma Scope, which appears to be a comprehensive suite of sparse autoencoders (SAEs) trained on Gemma 2 models. This is a significant research contribution from Google DeepMind in the field of mechanistic interpretability. Key points from the paper: 1. **What it is**: Gemma Scope is an open suite of JumpReLU SAEs trained on all layers and sub-layers of Gemma 2 2B and 9B models, and select layers of Gemma 2 27B base models. 2. **Why it matters**: SAEs are an unsupervised method for learning sparse decompositions of neural network representations into interpretable features. This helps with interpretability research but has been limited by high training costs. 3. **Technical details**: - Uses JumpReLU activation function (a shifted Heaviside step function with ReLU) - Trained on 4-16B tokens of text - Contains over 400 SAEs with more than 30 million learned features total - Used over 20% of GPT-3's training compute - Released under CC-BY-4.0 license 4. **Key findings**: - Delta loss is higher for residual stream SAEs compared to MLP and attention SAEs - SAEs trained on base models transfer well to instruction-tuned models - Feature splitting phenomenon observed as SAE width increases - Similar interpretability across different SAE architectures 5. **Open problems identified**: - Understanding SAE structure and relationships - Using SAEs for real-world tasks (jailbreak detection, steering) - Red-teaming SAEs - Scalable circuit analysis - Improvements to SAE architectures This is a significant contribution to the interpretability field, providing open resources for researchers to build upon.
This is a fascinating paper! Gemma Scope represents a massive engineering effort to democratize interpretability research by releasing a comprehensive suite of sparse autoencoders (SAEs) for the Gemma 2 model family.
Some key highlights that stand out:
Scale and Scope
- 400+ SAEs covering every layer and sublayer of Gemma 2 2B/9B (and select layers of 27B)
- 30+ million learned features - essentially a massive dictionary of interpretable directions in the models' representation spaces
- Required >20% of GPT-3's training compute and saved ~20 PiB of activations to disk
Technical Innovation
The use of JumpReLU SAEs is particularly interesting - they use a learnable threshold per feature rather than fixed sparsity constraints, allowing variable numbers of active features across different contexts. The engineering challenges they solved around distributed training and data loading at this scale are impressive.
Key Findings
- Residual stream SAEs have higher delta loss than MLP/attention SAEs, despite comparable reconstruction quality - suggesting even small errors in the residual stream significantly impact model behavior
- Base model SAEs transfer surprisingly well to instruction-tuned models, which suggests fine-tuning may primarily re-weight existing features rather than create entirely new ones
- Feature splitting phenomenon where wider SAEs decompose concepts into finer-grained sub-features
Research Opportunities
The paper's list of open problems is particularly valuable - from understanding whether SAEs find "true" features to practical applications like jailbreak detection and circuit analysis. The fact these are released under CC-BY-4.0 makes them accessible for academic research.
This feels like a significant step toward making mechanistic interpretability more accessible and practical. What aspects are you most interested in exploring?
Does the paper discuss any downsides of publishing all of the autoencoders from a safety perspective?
Thinking Summary
The user is asking about whether the Gemma Scope paper discusses potential safety downsides of releasing all these sparse autoencoders. This is a good question about dual-use concerns - while SAEs are meant to help with safety and interpretability, they could potentially be misused. Let me search through the paper content for any discussion of safety concerns, risks, or downsides of releasing these models. I'll look for sections that might discuss: 1. Safety considerations 2. Potential misuse 3. Dual-use concerns 4. Risk assessment 5. Any discussion of why they chose to release vs. keep private Looking through the paper... I don't see an explicit section on safety downsides or risks of releasing the SAEs. The paper focuses heavily on: - Technical details of training - Evaluation metrics - Potential positive use cases - Open problems that could be solved The closest thing to safety considerations I see is: 1. The mention that SAEs could help with "detecting and fixing jailbreaks" and "helping find new jailbreaks/red-teaming models" - but this is framed as a positive application 2. The general framing that these tools will help make models safer But I don't see any discussion of potential negative uses or safety downsides of releasing these interpretability tools publicly. This is actually a notable omission for a paper from a major AI lab releasing significant interpretability infrastructure.
Looking through the paper, I don't see any explicit discussion of potential safety downsides or risks from releasing these SAEs publicly. This is a notable omission.
The paper frames the release entirely in positive terms - enabling research, democratizing access to interpretability tools, and helping make models safer. The closest it comes to acknowledging dual-use potential is in Section 5 where they list applications like:
- "Detecting or fixing jailbreaks"
- "Helping find new jailbreaks/red-teaming models"
But even these are framed as beneficial safety research rather than potential risks.
Some potential safety concerns that aren't addressed:
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Adversarial use: SAEs could potentially help bad actors better understand model internals to craft more sophisticated attacks or manipulations
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Capability enhancement: Understanding feature representations could potentially help in developing more capable systems without corresponding safety measures
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Privacy concerns: SAEs might reveal information about training data or model behaviors that could be exploited
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Jailbreaking acceleration: While they mention using SAEs to fix jailbreaks, the same tools could potentially make finding jailbreaks easier for malicious actors
This seems like a significant gap in the paper, especially given that major AI labs typically include safety and ethical considerations sections in their releases. It's particularly surprising given that the paper explicitly aims to help with "preventing deception or manipulation from autonomous AI agents" - suggesting awareness of safety concerns - but doesn't discuss how releasing these tools might cut both ways.